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ON THE COMPUTATIONAL SOLUTION OF  
DYNAMIC-PROGRAMMING PROCESSES-I  
ON A TACTICAL AIR-WARFARE MODEL OF MENGEL

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### SUMMARY

This is the first of a series of papers devoted to the computational solution of dynamic programming processes. In it we use the functional-equation approach to treat a tactical air-warfare model that A. Mengel previously has considered by means of classical variational techniques.

CONTENTS

SUMMARY .....	11
Section	
1. INTRODUCTION .....	1
2. ATTRITION PROCESSES .....	1
3. MENGEL'S MODEL .....	3
4. DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING APPROACH—I .....	4
5. DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING APPROACH—II .....	5
6. TIME-DEPENDENT PROCESSES .....	6
7. DISCUSSION OF COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURES .....	7
8. GRAPHS .....	11
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	21

ON THE COMPUTATIONAL SOLUTION OF  
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ON A TACTICAL AIR-WARFARE MODEL OF MENGEL

1. INTRODUCTION

This is the first of a series of papers devoted to the computational solution of dynamic-programming processes. Although the papers are linked together by a common method each of the diverse problems we shall treat possesses particular features of interest and difficulty that make a detailed exposition of the coding worthwhile.

It is planned eventually to present all the papers of the series in the form of a book.

We would like to express our appreciation to E. W. Paxson for a number of helpful comments and suggestions which we have incorporated in the paper.

2. ATTRITION PROCESSES

The study of attrition processes arising from military campaigns leads to a class of variational problems that are particularly well suited to dynamic programming.

Consider the following model. Let the state of Blue's forces at time  $t$  be specified by the vector  $x$ , with components  $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_M$ , and the state of Red's forces be specified by  $y$ , with components  $y_1, y_2, \dots, y_N$ . At each stage of the process, which may be discrete or continuous—and this has less to do with reality than with the type of computing machine which is available, a digital computer or an analog computer—each side allocates a certain portion of the forces to combat, obtaining

in this way a certain payoff and suffering, in return, a certain attrition. Let  $z$  be the allocation vector of Blue and  $w$  the allocation vector of Red. The natural constraints are, in vector form,

$$(1) \quad 0 \leq z \leq x, \quad 0 \leq w \leq y;$$

that is,

$$(2) \quad \begin{aligned} 0 \leq z_i \leq x_i, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, M, \\ 0 \leq w_j \leq y_j, \quad j = 1, 2, \dots, N. \end{aligned}$$

The single-stage payoff is determined as some function

$$(3) \quad R(x, y, z, w)$$

(in practice, usually the most difficult function to decide upon) and we assume that we know the attrition due to combat, so that

$$(4) \quad \begin{aligned} \frac{dx}{dt} &= F(x, y, z, w), \quad x(0) = q_1 \\ \frac{dy}{dt} &= G(x, y, z, w), \quad y(0) = q_2 \end{aligned}$$

where  $q_1$  and  $q_2$  are the initial forces.

The mathematical problem is then that of determining

$$(5) \quad \min_w \max_z \int_0^T R(x, y, z, w) dt,$$

where  $T$  is the duration of the process, subject to the constraints (2) and the relations (4).

Alternatively, we may wish to determine

$$(6) \quad \max_z \min_w \int_0^T R(x, y, z, w) dt.$$

Since, in general, the determination of min max or max min is a formidable problem, particularly if  $\min \max \neq \max \min$ , we shall reduce the magnitude of the problem by fixing Red's strategy, say  $w = w^*$ , and proceeding to determine

$$(7) \quad \max_z \int_0^T R(x, y, z, w^*) dt,$$

subject to

$$(8) \quad (a) \quad 0 \leq z \leq x,$$

$$(b) \quad \frac{dx}{dt} = F(x, y, z, w^*), \quad x(0) = q_1,$$

$$\frac{dy}{dt} = G(x, y, z, w^*), \quad y(0) = q_2.$$

Problems of this type are difficult, using conventional methods, because of the presence of the constraints, and the analytic structure of the functions  $F$ ,  $G$  and  $R$ .

### 3. MENGEL'S MODEL

Let us now consider the attrition process that has been discussed by Arnold Mengel, using classical variational techniques [5].

Considering only air forces consisting of one type of plane, for the purpose of an exploratory model, we have the equations<sup>(1)</sup>

$$(1) \quad \begin{aligned} \dot{x} &= G_1(x, y, s_2) = r_1 - a_2 x - x(1 - e^{-b_2 s_2 y/x}), \\ \dot{y} &= G_2(x, y, s_1) = r_2 - a_1 y - y(1 - e^{-b_1 s_1 x/y}), \end{aligned}$$

---

(1)  $r_1, r_2$  are replacement rates of new aircraft. The terms  $a_2 x, a_1 y$  represent operational (non-combat) attrition rates. The term  $s_2 y (=w)$  is Red's counter air effort over  $(t, t+dt)$ , with "kill potential"  $b_2 s_2 y$ . The chance any one of the  $x$  aircraft is killed by one of the  $s_2 y$  attacks is  $b_2$ . The average number of attacks per Blue aircraft is  $n = s_2 y/x$ . Hence the probability of survival is  $(1-b_2)^n \approx \exp(-b_2 n)$ .

for fixed  $s_2$ , with the payoff function<sup>(1)</sup>

$$(2) \quad J(s_1) = \int_0^T [(1-s_1)x - (1-s_2)y] dt.$$

Here

(3)  $x(t)$  = the number of Blue aircraft at time  $t$ ,

$y(t)$  = the number of Red Aircraft at time  $t$ .

The allocation variables are

(4)  $s_1(t)$  = fraction of Blue sorties on counter-air strikes,

$s_2(t)$  = fraction of Red sorties on counter-air strikes.

As mentioned above, we shall fix  $s_2(t)$ , in this case by assuming various constant levels,  $s_2^*$ , and then maximizing  $J(s_1)$  over all  $s_1(t)$  satisfying  $0 \leq s_1(t) \leq 1$ .

#### 4. DYNAMIC-PROGRAMMING APPROACH—I

Setting

$$(1) \quad \max_{s_1} J(s_1) = f(q_1, q_2, T),$$

we obtain, as in [1], the nonlinear partial differential equation

$$(2) \quad \frac{\partial f}{\partial T} = \max_{0 \leq s_1 \leq 1} \left[ (1-s_1)q_1 - (1-s_2^*)q_2 + G_1(q_1, q_2, s_2) \frac{\partial f}{\partial q_1} + G_2(q_1, q_2, s_1) \frac{\partial f}{\partial q_2} \right]$$

with

$$(3) \quad f(q_1, q_2, 0) = 0.$$

This equation may be solved numerically using approximating difference equations in the usual fashion. In practice, we en-

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
(1) This measures the total excess of Blue's combat capability over Red's during the campaign on missions other than counter-air.



countered a great deal of difficulty with this method due to instability arising from transition curves. Consequently, we went over to the method we shall present in the next section. This method has applications to the numerical integration of other types of partial differential equations, a matter which we have discussed elsewhere.

## 5. DYNAMIC-PROGRAMMING APPROACH—II

Let us consider the following discrete process. Divide the interval  $[0, T]$  into  $N$  equal parts of length  $\Delta$ ,



Let us assume that decisions may be made only at times  $k\Delta$ ,  $k = 0, 1, 2, \dots, N-1$ . As far as actual processes are concerned, this may be a more realistic assumption than that of a continuous process.

In place of the equations (b) of Section 2, we have the difference equations, or recurrence relations,

$$\begin{aligned} (1) \quad x_{k+1} &= x_k + G_1(x_k, y_k, s_2(k)) \Delta, & x_0 &= q_1, \\ y_{k+1} &= y_k + G_2(x_k, y_k, s_1(k)) \Delta, & y_0 &= q_2, \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} (2) \quad x_k &= x(k\Delta), \quad y_k = y(k\Delta), \\ s_{1k} &= s_1(k\Delta). \end{aligned}$$

The sequence  $\{s_{1k}\}$  is to be chosen to maximize

$$(3) \quad J(s_1) = \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} \left[ (1-s_{1k})x_k - (1-s_{2k})y_k \right],$$

subject to the restriction  $0 \leq s_{1k} \leq 1$ .

Let

$$(4) \quad \max J(s_1) = f_N(q_1, q_2),$$

with

$$(5) \quad f_1(q_1, q_2) = q_1 - (1-s_{2k})q_2.$$

The basic recurrence relation used to compute the sequence  $\{f_N(q_1, q_2)\}$  is

$$(6) \quad f_N(q_1, q_2) = \max_{0 \leq s_1 \leq 1} \left[ (1-s_1)q_1 - (1-s_2)q_2 \right. \\ \left. + f_{N-1}(q_1 + G_1(q_1, q_2, s_2)\Delta, q_2 + G_2(q_1, q_2, s_1)\Delta) \right]$$

for  $N = 1, 2, \dots$

## 6. TIME-DEPENDENT PROCESSES

Let us consider a process of the same general type in which the attrition and payoff functions depend upon time. Thus

$$(1) \quad \frac{dx}{dt} = G_1(x, y, s_2, t), \quad x(0) = q_1,$$

$$\frac{dy}{dt} = G_2(x, y, s_1, t), \quad y(0) = q_2,$$

and we wish to choose  $s_1$  so as to maximize

$$(2) \quad J(s_1) = \int_0^T P(x, y, s_1, t) dt.$$

In this case, we keep the terminal point  $T$  fixed and describe the state of the process by means of the resources and the starting

point.

The discrete maximization problem is then: Maximize

$$(3) \quad J_R(s_1) = \sum_{k=R}^N P(x_k, y_k, s_{1k}, k),$$

subject to the constraints

$$(4) \quad x_{k+1} = x_k + G_1(x_k, y_k, s_{2k}, k), \quad x_R = q_1,$$

$$y_{k+1} = y_k + G_2(x_k, y_k, s_{1k}, k), \quad y_R = q_2.$$

Setting

$$(5) \quad \max J_R(s_1) = f_R(q_1, q_2),$$

we obtain the recurrence relations

$$(6) \quad f_R(q_1, q_2) = \max_{0 \leq s_1 \leq 1} \left[ P(q_1, q_2, s_1, R) + f_{R+1}(q_1 + G_1(q_1, q_2, s_2, R), q_2 + G_2(q_1, q_2, s_1, R)) \right],$$

for  $R = 0, 1, 2, \dots, N-1$ , with

$$(7) \quad f_N(q_1, q_2) = \max_{0 \leq s_1 \leq 1} P(q_1, s_2, s_1, N).$$

## 7. DISCUSSION OF COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURES

The recursive nature of the problem makes it particularly suited to digital computation. A fairly sizable problem can be solved in 500 instructions, leaving the bulk of high-speed storage available for tabulation of the functions. In this initial study the luxury of floating-point arithmetic was allowed, due to uncertainty concerning the ranges of the variables. Considerable additional time and space could be saved in

later studies by fixed-point programming.

The program itself can be divided into 3 logical sections. A master routine does the bookkeeping, tallying, and sequencing; a subroutine evaluates  $F(q_1, q_2, s_1) + f_R(q_1+G_1, q_2+G_2)$  for given  $q_1, q_2, s_1, s_2$ , and a table of  $f_R$ ; a second subroutine performs the maximization of the above expression over the interval  $0 \leq s_1 \leq 1$ .

The flow-chart governing the computation is shown in Figure 8.

In more detail, the computation proceeds as follows. Under control of the master, the constants  $\Delta q_1$ ,  $\Delta q_2$ ,  $s_2$ ,  $N$ , and  $m+1$  are input:  $\Delta q_1$  and  $\Delta q_2$  determine the density of the grid over which the function  $f_R$  is to be evaluated; the parameter  $s_2$  is Red's constant strategy;  $N$  is the number of stages for which the process is allowed to continue; and  $m+1$  determines the size of the grid, its dimensions being  $m\Delta q_1$  by  $m\Delta q_2$ .

The quantity  $f_1(q_1, q_2)$  is evaluated over the grid as  $\max_{0 \leq s_1 \leq 1} [F(q_1, q_2, s_1) + f_0(q_1+G_1, q_2+G_2)]$ . Since the return from a zero-stage war is identically zero, the maximum always occurs when  $s_1 = 0$  so that  $f_1(q_1, q_2)$  is merely  $q_1 - (1-s_2)q_2$ . This corresponds to the fact that during the last stage of a war Blue's airpower will be directed entirely against Red's ground forces.

The calculation of  $f_N$  with  $f_{N-1}$  now known is not quite so trivial! However, due to the recurrence relation, this calculation actually defines the remainder of the program. Suppose we wish to evaluate  $f_N(Q_1, Q_2)$ , where  $(Q_1, Q_2)$  is some  $(i \Delta q_1, j \Delta q_2)$ .

For a particular  $s_1 = S_1$  we evaluate  $(Q_1 + G_1(Q_1, Q_2, s_2), Q_2 + G_2(Q_1, Q_2, S_1))$ . This determines a point  $X$  in the  $q_1, q_2$  plane. Now  $X$  falls within a rectangle of dimensions  $\Delta q_1$  by  $\Delta q_2$ , where  $f_{N-1}$  is known at the four corners, and  $f_{N-1}(X)$  is found by linear interpolation. By adding  $(1-S_1)Q_1 - (1-S_2)Q_2$ , we determine  $f_N(Q_1, Q_2)$  for  $s_1 = S_1$ . We need only to repeat this process where  $s_1$  takes on values between 0 and 1 to determine the maximum. Since for the majority of a process  $s_1 = 0$  or 1, it is expedient first to test for an endpoint maximum before searching the interior region. Since  $f_R$  for each  $R, R=1, 2, \dots, N$ , is evaluated over a grid of  $(m+1)^2$  points, it is essential to optimize the search process. Consequently the technique described in [4] was adopted.

Once the function has been evaluated for a fixed  $R, R+1$  replaces  $R-1$ , the newly calculated table  $f_R$  replaces  $f_{R+1}$  in high-speed storage, and the calculation of  $f_{R+1}$  begins.

Since  $s_1$ , the Blue strategy which maximizes  $f$ , is generally of more interest than the resulting payoff,  $f$ , a table of  $s_1$  associated with each  $f_R$  is stored and punched out prior to the computation of  $f_{R+1}$ .

When  $R$  reaches  $N$ , assumed length of the conflict, the following information has been obtained:

- 1) The return attainable by Blue in an  $N$ -stage war, where Blue enters the conflict with  $q_1$  planes, Red with  $q_2$ , Red uses the fixed allocation between air and ground support  $s_2$ , and Blue uses an optimal allocation. This by definition is  $f_N(q_1, q_2)$ .

2) Blue optimal strategy during the first stage of the  $N$ -stage war. This is the  $s_1$  which maximizes  $f_N$ .

3) Blue optimal strategy during the first stage of a war of duration  $R$ ,  $R=1,2,\dots,N-1$ , for any initial forces  $q_1$  and  $q_2$ . These tables are punched during the stage-by-stage calculation.

The process determining explicitly an optimal policy is essentially that described above, but in reverse. Knowing  $R$ , the stage, and  $(q_1, q_2)$ , we refer to the table of  $s_1$ 's to determine the strategy associated with  $(q_1, q_2)$ . Employing this strategy we find ourselves at the  $(R+1)^{st}$  stage and Blue possesses  $q_1+G_1$  planes against Red's  $q_2+G_2$ . Furthermore, evaluation of  $(1-s_1)q_1 + (1-s_2)q_2$  produces the payoff during the  $(R)^{th}$  time interval. By referring to the tables of optimal strategies for the  $(R+1)^{st}$  stage and initial forces  $q_1+G_1$  and  $q_2+G_2$ , we determine the optimal allocation for the  $(R+1)^{st}$  period. The process is one of repeatedly determining the initial strategy in wars of decreasing length and decreasing forces. The sequence defines Blue's optimal policy.

At this time, only the most essential computational variations have been investigated. For example, it was found that due to the near-linear behavior of  $f_R$  over the range 0 to 10000,  $\Delta q_1 = \Delta q_2 = 500$  gave sufficiently accurate results to justify its use. This same property led to the choice of linear interpolation throughout the grid. Two versions of the Fibonacci search method of S. Johnson [4] were considered, one using predetermined points of evaluation, the other calculating the points.

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The latter, of course, is more general, but the advantages offered by less calculation and faster convergence led to the choice of the former. Printout of all functions and strategy values along the grid was made optional. Considerable time was saved by suppression of printing when  $s_1$  equaled 0, a frequent occurrence during the initial phases of a calculation.

## 8. GRAPHS

Results are shown on the following pages. Figure 1 shows the changing relative strengths of the rival air forces when Blue employs an optimal policy. Due to Blue's initial counter-air tactics, Red's force is reduced during the early stages, while Blue's force drops suddenly in the later stages when counter-ground strategy is used. Figure 2 shows that Blue's initial allocation of planes is against the Red air force if the total number of planes in each force is fairly even. If Blue has a marked numerical superiority or inferiority, a counter-ground strategy should be employed. Figure 3 depicts Blue's strategy where initial forces are equal. The next three graphs show Blue's strategy as it changes with time for all initial conditions. Figure 7 shows the excess sorties flown by Blue as a result of employing an optimal, rather than constant, strategy. The use of an optimal policy in this particular example is shown to be equivalent to about 800 planes; i.e., with the given parameter values Blue can start with 800 fewer planes and still fly as many sorties as Red during a 15-stage conflict.

Throughout these numerical examples, we have fixed both sides replacement rates,  $r_1$  and  $r_2$ , as 100 planes per stage, non-combat


attrition rates,  $a$ , as .1, and kill probabilities,  $b$ , as .2.

Figure 8 shows the flow diagram used for computation.

This structure of the maximizing strategy is typical of a large class of problems. The reason for it lies in the concavity of the function appearing in (5.6) as a function of  $s_1$ . This concavity in turn is based upon the linearity of the pay-off function, and the concavity of the attrition function. Two conclusions can be drawn from this. In the first place, it shows that great mathematical simplifications ensue when we introduce concave functions, or convex functions if we are minimizing. Thus, if we have functions which for one reason or another are not concave, it may be well initially to use concave approximations to these functions. On the other hand, these results show the dangers inherent in mathematical models. In the real world, such concentration on counter-air or counter-surface at various phases of the campaign is dubious. Catastrophic loss by ground forces might occur before the time  $T$  of the campaign has elapsed. Such effects are not measured by the "uniform" pay-off function  $J$ .


There are, of course, dangers in conclusions based upon this one-sided approach in which we fix Red's strategy. Iteration procedures may be considered in which we alternately fix one side's policy and then the other's. These must be used with care, since we know from much simpler games that unless some feedback from stage to stage is used, the results will not converge.






$q_1 = 5000$   
 $q_2 = 5000$   
 $s_1$  optimal  
 $s_2 = 0.5$   
 $N = 16$

Fig. 1--Changing relative strengths of Blue and Red air forces under optimal Blue policy.





Initial Blue air force = 5000  
 12-stage war  
 $s_2 = .5$



Initial Red air force = 5000  
 12 stage war  
 $s_2 = .5$

Fig. 2—Initial allocation of Blue planes under varying relative air forces.



$$s_2 = 5$$

$q_1 = 5000$  initially

$q_2 = 5000$  initially

Fig. 3—Blue's strategy when initial forces are equal.

$S_2 = .2$

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














Fig. 4—Variation of Blue's strategy  $s_1$  with time ( $N=8$  to 13) for initial Blue force  $q_1$  and initial Red force  $q_2$  between 0 and 10,000 and for Red strategy  $s_2 = 0.2$ .






**Fig. 5—Variation of Blue's strategy  $s_1$  with time ( $N=9$  to  $14$ ) for initial Blue force  $q_1$  and initial Red force  $q_2$  between  $0$  and  $10,000$  and for Red strategy  $s_2 = 0.5$ .**

Review  
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 -18-



**Fig. 6—**Variation of Blue's strategy  $s_1$  with time ( $N=12$  to 25) for initial Blue force  $q_1$  and initial Red force  $q_2$  between 0 and 10,000 and for Red strategy  $s_2 = 0.8$ .



15 stage war  
Blue uses optimal strategy  
Red strategy  $S_2 = .5$




Fig. 7—Excess counter-surface sorties




Fig.8—Flow-chart used for computational solution



P-1072  
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